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ABSTRACT

The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has
encountered significant difficulty in conducting investigations.
Faced with violence on the ground, witnesses who fear
repercussions, and limitations on resources, the Prosecutor has
turned to relying on secondary forms of evidence, such as the
reports of NGOs and other third-party informationproviders.
This Note argues that the Prosecutor'suse of such evidence
is problematic because it fails to adequately follow the
evidentiary rules of the Court and, subsequently, to protect the
rights of witnesses and defendants. Moreover, the Office of the
Prosecutor'sdependence on third-party evidence has stunted the
Prosecutor'sability to carry out her mandate and achieve justice
for victims. The solution is to add an article to the Rome Statute
that includes several proceduralrequirements governing the use
of third-party evidence. This structural addition will properly
strike the balance between the Prosecutor's need to rely on thirdparty evidence and defendants' rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On December 5, 2014, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) filed a notice of withdrawal of
charges against accused Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta of Kenya,1 who had
been charged with the crimes against humanity of murder,
deportation or forcible transfer of population, rape, persecution, and
other inhumane acts. 2 The Prosecutor gave insufficient evidence as
the reason for withdrawing the charges, citing the Trial Chamber's
December 3, 2014 ruling. 3 In that ruling, the Trial Chamber declined,
after three years of proceedings and one six-month adjournment, to
postpone trial proceedings further. 4 The Chamber reasoned that
despite five years of investigations into the Kenya situation, the
prosecution had not demonstrated a "concrete prospect" that it would
collect sufficient evidence to prove the charges beyond a reasonable
5
doubt.
The decision by the Prosecutor to withdraw the charges against
Mr. Kenyatta was the culmination of several years of evidentiary
wrangling with the Kenyan government. In March 2011, the Kenyan
government filed an application challenging the admissibility of the
Kenyan cases in the ICC. 6 The court rejected this application, 7 and

1.
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Notice of Withdrawal
of the Charges Against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Dec. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Notice of
Withdrawal], http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1879204.pdf [https://perma.cc/564KNHN9] (archived Feb. 17, 2016).
2.
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public Redacted
Version of the Second Updated Document Containing the Charges, pt. VII, 25 (May 7,
2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1590453.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQV4-4YV5]
(archived Feb. 17, 2016).
3.
Notice of Withdrawal, supra note 1, 7 1-2.
4.
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on
Prosecution's Application for a Further Adjournment, IT 47, 50, 57 (Dec. 3, 2014)
[hereinafter Decision on Prosecution's Application], http://www.icc-cpi.inticcdocs/
doc/doc1878156.pdf [https://perma.cc/GCJ2-UWCT] (archived Feb. 17, 2016).
5.
Id. 7 47, 49-50.
6.
Prosecutor v. Ruto & Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case Nos. ICC-01/09-01/l1
& ICC-01/09-02/11, Application on Behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya
Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc1050028.pdf [https:/perma.cc/77DL-2EX3] (archived Feb. 17, 2016).
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the ensuing exchanges between the Kenyan government and the OTP
grew increasingly hostile. 8 In May 2013, a responsive filing by the
OTP alleged that "the Office of the Prosecutor . . . has encountered
serious difficulties in securing full and timely cooperation from the
Government of Kenya . . . . 9 The response went on to note that
certain evidence key to the Prosecutor's investigation of the Kenya
situation was available only through the Kenyan government. 10
Additionally, the OTP response stated that though the government
had cooperated with certain OTP requests, it had refused to grant
others, severely undermining the investigation. 11 The document
proclaimed that "the [Government of Kenya] has constructed an
outward appearance of cooperation, while failing to execute fully the
OTP's most important requests." 12 In its response to these
allegations, the Government of Kenya rejected the Prosecutor's
accusations as factual misstatements and declared that it had
cooperated fully with and, indeed, helped to facilitate the OTP's
13
investigation.
In her statement addressing the withdrawal of the charges,
Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda blamed the failure of the Kenyatta
proceedings on the Kenyan government. 14 She also alleged additional
Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the
7.
Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case
Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (May 30, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc1078823.pdf [https://perma.ccIP5L7-KNH5] (archived Feb. 17, 2016).
8.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public
Redacted Version of the 8 May 2013 Prosecution Response to the "Government of
Kenya's Submissions on the Status of Cooperation with the International Criminal
Court, or, in the Alternative, Application for Leave to File Observations Pursuant to
Rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICC-01/09-02/11-713)" (May 10,
Response],
http://www.icc2013
Prosecution
8
May
2013)
[hereinafter
(archived Feb.17,
[https://perma.cc/S4BP-VXJG]
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1591193.pdf
2016) (responding to April 8 submissions by the Government of Kenya and alleging
failure to cooperate on the part of the Government); Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No.
ICC-01/09-02/11, Government of Kenya's Submissions on the Status of Cooperation
with the International Criminal Court, or, in the Alternative, Application for Leave to
File Observations Pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
(Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1577522.pdf [https://perma.cc/23XEJ5AA] (archived Feb. 17, 2016) (responding to claims by the Prosecution that the
Kenyan government was not cooperating with the OTP investigation).
9.
8 May 2013 Prosecution Response, supra note 8, 1.
Id. 3.
10.
11.
Id. 4.
12.
Id.
13.
See Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Reply by the
Government of Kenya to the 'Prosecution Response to the 'Government of Kenya's
Submissions on the Status of Cooperation with the International Criminal Court, or, in
the Alternative, Application for Leave to File Observations Pursuant to Rule 103(1) of
3-8 (June 10, 2013),
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence' (ICC-01/09-02/11-713)",
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1602452.pdf [https://perma.cc/785A-JAQV] (archived
Feb. 24, 2016) (rebutting six alleged misrepresentations of fact).
Press Release, International Criminal Court [ICC] Office of the Prosecutor,
14.
Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on

822

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 49:819

factors that had hindered her investigations: "A steady and relentless
stream of false media reports," social media efforts to identify
protected witnesses, and widespread attempts to harass and
15
intimidate would-be witnesses.
Compare the ICC investigations in Kenya to those of Nazi war
criminals carried out by the Allies in the wake of World War II. The
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, where between 1945
and 1946 the highest-ranking Nazi officials and leaders were
prosecuted for war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against
humanity, and conspiracy, 16 marked the inception of international
criminal law.17 The Nuremberg trials, which have received their fair
share of criticism, 18 have nonetheless been widely perceived as
setting the standards for international criminal proceedings. 19
Indeed, the establishment of the ICC fifty years after the trials has
20
been heralded as the fulfillment of the Nuremberg legacy.
Though one objective of the Nuremberg proceedings was to bring
21
individuals charged with heinous crimes to justice for their actions,
the trials also served the function of preserving a meticulously
the Status of the Government of Kenya's Cooperation with the Prosecution's
Investigations in the Kenyatta Case (Dec. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Statement of the
Prosecutor], http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/icc/press%20and%20medialpress%20relea
ses/Pages/otp-stat-04-12-2014.aspx [https://perma.cc8ST2-AWX4] (archived Feb. 17,
2016).
15.
Id.
16.
See generally TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL (1947) [hereinafter TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS], http://www.loc.gov/rr/frdfMilitaryLaw/NT-major-war-criminals.html (last
updated Aug. 13, 2014) [https://perma.ccKKG4-AC5X] (archived Feb. 17, 2016).
17.
See, e.g., Benjamin B. Ferencz, International Criminal Courts: The Legacy
of Nuremberg, 10 PACE INT'L L. REV. 203, 215 (1998), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cg
i/viewcontent.cgi?article=1260&context=pilr [https://perma.cc/8MEW-QCQ9] (archived
Feb. 17, 2016) ('The International Military Tribunal in particular, and the twelve
subsequent trials at Nuremberg, laid the basic foundations for the later development of
international criminal law.").
18.
See, e.g., Christian Tomuschat, The Legacy of Nuremberg, 4 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 830, 832-37 (2006), http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/hpschmitz/PSC354/PSC354
Readings/TomuschatLegacyNuremberg.pdf [https://perma.cc/MT5R-VU4K] (archived
Feb. 17, 2016) (discussing the major criticisms of the Nuremberg trials, including the
"victor's justice" objection, the lack of international law precedent, and the ex post facto
claim).
19.
See, e.g., id. at 837-41 (describing how the Nuremberg proceedings
established the foundations of international criminal law; namely, noting that the
trials signaled a change in states' conceptions of absolute sovereign power, the
international community, and individual criminal responsibility in an international
context).
20.
See, e.g., Philippe Kirsch, Applying the Principles of Nuremberg in the
International Criminal Court, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 501 (2007),
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1146&context=law-globals
tudies [https://perma.cc/A84N-RBMF] (archived Feb. 17, 2016) (arguing that "the
International Criminal Court is the continuation of the Nuremberg trials.").
21.
See, e.g., id. at 502 ('The Nuremberg trials rested on two fundamental
principles. First, individuals can and should be held accountable for the most serious
international crimes.").
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22
documented historical record, of the Holocaust and Nazi crimes.
Allied prosecutors relied extensively on records created by the
Germans themselves. 23 The Nazis maintained precise documentation
of their activities and were unsuccessful in destroying many of their
records at the end of the war. 2 4 Consequently, Robert Jackson and his
team of prosecutors had their pick of evidence as they prepared their
case, ultimately sorting through thousands of tons of documents for
trial.25 Robert Jackson eschewed the use of victim testimony at
Nuremberg, relying instead on "a straightforward paper trail of the
case, one that would not be open to criticism directed towards the
26
credibility of victim testimony."
Unfortunately for the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC, today
such documentation of modern international crimes is hard to come
by. Several reasons may explain why documentary evidence is often
unavailable for a modern criminal trial. 27 A non-cooperative state
may refuse to produce documents. 2 8 Militant groups, which lack the
hierarchical structure of a military or government, may not give
direct orders or maintain documentation of orders; moreover, actual
29
chains of command may be different than those reflected on paper.
The current standards for evidence, especially as they relate to
defendants' rights, may prohibit the use of Nuremberg-style
documents even when they do exist.30 As prosecutor Anton Steynberg

TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 16 (constituting the
22.
official record of the first Nuremberg trial).
23.
See id. (including the evidence introduced by the prosecution during the
course of the major Nuremberg trials).
24.
See, e.g., id. (demonstrating, through the submitted evidence, the intensive
recordkeeping of the Nazi regime); Combating Holocaust Denial: Evidence of the
Holocaust Presented at Nuremberg, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM'L MUSEUM [hereinafter
Combating Holocaust Denial], http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=
10007271 [https:/Hperma.cc/78F2-3SWJ] (archived Feb. 17, 2016) ("While the Germans
destroyed some of the historical record at the end of the war and some German records
were destroyed during the Allied bombing of German cities, Allied armies captured
millions of documents during the conquest of Germany in 1945.").
25.
See, e.g., Combating Holocaust Denial, supra note 24 (noting the copious
amounts of records recovered by the Allies, and stating that 3,000 tons were submitted
at the major Nuremberg trials alone); Robert H. Jackson, Opening Statement Before
the International Military Tribunal (Nov. 21, 1945) [hereinafter Jackson Opening
Statement], https://www.roberthjackson.org/speech-and-writing/opening-statement-bef
ore-the-international-military-tribunal/ [https://perma.cc/H2PX-JV9J] (archived Apr. 9,
2016) (recalling that only eight months prior to the first trial, "none of the hundreds of
tons of official German documents had been examined").
26.
Sonali Chakravarti, More than "Cheap Sentimentality" Victim Testimony
at Nuremberg, the Eichmann Trial, and Truth Commissions, 15 CONSTELLATIONS 223,
225 (2008).

27.
INT'L LAW.
28.
29.
30.

See Daniel Tilley, The Non-Rules of Evidence in the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 45
695, 698 (2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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observed during his opening statement at the trial of Kenyan
defendants William Ruto and Joshua Sang:

[]he criminal organisation in question . . . was not a formal military or
governmental body. It' did not have formal ranks, offices, or letters of
appointment. It did not keep formal records in the form of cabinet minutes, nor
did it report its activities via military situation reports. Rather, this network
was a criminal organisation in the style of a mafia group or a triad
organisation; namely an association
in fact of individuals connected by ethnic
31
ties and a shared criminal purpose.
This Note will demonstrate, as evidenced by the Prosecutor's
investigations in Kenya, that when faced with multiple such
situations, the ICC Prosecutor has primarily relied on alternate forms
of evidence--namely witness testimony and the reports of nongovernmental
organizations
(NGOs) and other third-party
investigators.
This Note argues that the Office of the Prosecutor's use of such
evidence is problematic because it fails to adequately follow the
evidentiary rules of the Court and, subsequently, to protect the rights
of witnesses and defendants. Moreover, the OTP's dependence on
third-party evidence has stunted the Prosecutor's ability to carry out
her mandate and achieve justice for victims of the most heinous
international crimes, as illustrated by the Kenya investigations. The
solution is to add an article to the Rome Statute-the governing
document of the ICC that includes several procedural requirements
governing the use of third-party evidence. This structural addition
will properly strike the balance between the Prosecutor's need to rely
on third-party evidence and defendants' rights. Far from extending
the time and resources necessary to bring an international criminal
prosecution to trial and conviction, including these additional
procedural hurdles at an early stage in the investigation will ensure
that the OTP is only investing its energy in those prosecutions it can
successfully complete.
This Note proceeds in Part II by outlining the statutory
framework governing ICC investigations. Part III analyzes several of
the problems plaguing the current system of ICC investigations,
employing the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo case and the
investigations in Kenya as lenses through which to view the broader
investigation infrastructure developed by the Office of the Prosecutor.
This Part goes on to critique the resultant problems stemming from
undue reliance on third-party evidence. Part IV evaluates the merits
of a structural addition to the Rome Statute, aimed at better

31.
Transcript of Trial Hearing at 26-27, Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC01/09-01/1126 (Sept. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Trial Transcript, Prosecutor v. Ruto], http:!/
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1643202.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q59R-DE9B]
(archived
Feb.17, 2016).
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balancing the prosecution's need to rely on third-party sources of
evidence with the accused's rights. Part V concludes by summarizing
how a change in evidentiary procedure would help the ICC come
closer to its intended goals of holding the most heinous international
criminals responsible for their actions and ensuring the fair and just
rule of law.

II.

THE ROME STATUTE FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTIGATIONS

The Rome Statute is the treaty that established the ICC and that
governs its operations. 3 2 The Statute entered into force in 2002 after
being adopted at a conference of 160 nations in 1999. 33 Currently,
123 states are State Parties to the Rome Statute; notably, the United
States is not a State Party. 34 The establishment of the ICC at the end
of the twentieth century represented a decades-long effort to create a
permanent international criminal court. 35 Several temporary ad hoc
criminal tribunals with limited jurisdiction had previously been set
up: the war crimes tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo in the wake of
WWII, the International Criminal Tribunal for • the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR). 36 The Rome Statute sets forth the jurisdictional and
procedural rules governing the ICC and establishes its four organs,
37
one of which is the Office of the Prosecutor.
The following subparts provide an overview of the ICC Office of
the Prosecutor and of the most significant sections of the Rome
Statute as they relate to the procedures and limits governing the
articles'
these
Understanding
investigations.
Prosecutor's
prescriptions for regulation of the Prosecutor and protection of the
accused is vital to evaluating how the limitations function in practice.

32.
CRIMINAL

INVL CRIMINAL COURT [ICC], UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT 3, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf

[https://perma.cc/6LJ8-AKSE] (archived Feb. 17, 2016).
Id. at 1.
33.
34.
The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT [ICC],
https://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%2Ostates%20parties
%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx#U [https://perma.cc/X3AK-WWUP] (archived
Feb.17, 2016).
See generally Leila Nadya Sadat, The Evolution of the International
35.
Criminal Court: From The Hague to Rome and Back Again, in THE UNITED STATES AND
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

31 (2000) (documenting the history of the International Criminal Court and its
predecessors).
36.
See id. at 36-39 (describing the development of the ad hoc tribunals).
37.
See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for
signatureJuly 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter
Rome Statute] (detailing, among other topics, "Jurisdiction, admissibility and
applicable law" and "Composition and administration of the Court"). The other three
organs are the Presidency, the Chambers, and the Registry. Id. art. 34.
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A. The Office of the Prosecutor
The Office of the Prosecutor is one of the four organs of the ICC
and is subdivided into three divisions: (i) Investigations; (ii)
Jurisdiction,
Complementarity,
and
Cooperation;
and
(iii)
Prosecutions. 38 At last official count in November 2015, the Office of
the Prosecutor employed 269 individuals, 39 only a portion of whom
work for the Investigations Division. Currently, the Office is
4
investigating nine situations. 0
B. Articles 12 and 13: Exercising Jurisdiction
Articles 12 and 13 of the Rome Statute set forth the
requirements that must be satisfied in order for the OTP to
investigate and prosecute criminal allegations in a particular
situation. 4 1 The ICC may exercise jurisdiction over a situation (i.e.,
an entire conflict, not merely the alleged wrongdoings of one side)
under the following three scenarios: (1) a State Party to the Rome
Statute refers the situation to the Prosecutor; (2) the UN Security
Council refers the situation to the Prosecutor; or (3) the Prosecutor
initiates a proprio motu (meaning "[o]f one's own accord") 42
investigation into the situation, in accordance with the requirements
of Article 15 of the Statute. 43 If the situation in question involves the
territory or nationals of a non-State Party (a state that has not signed
and ratified the Rome Statute), that nation may opt to accept the
jurisdiction of the Court. 44 Otherwise, the conduct at issue must have
taken place within the territory of a State Party or the accused must
45
be a national of a State Party.

Office of the Prosecutor, Int'l Criminal Court [ICC] [hereinafter Office of the
38.
Prosecutor],
http://www.icc-cpi.int/enmenus/icc/structure /%20of%/20the%/20court/office
0
%2 ofo2Othe%/o20prosecutor/Pages/office%/o20of%2Othe%/o20prosecutor.aspx [https://perm
a.cc/4ZFL-MPFY] (archived Feb.17, 2016).
39.

ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INT'L

CRIMINAL COURT [ICC], FOURTEENTH SESSION, THE HAGUE, 18-26 NOVEMBER 2015:
OFFICIAL RECORDS, VOL. I, at 17, ICC-ASP/14/20 (2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/asp-docs/ASP14/ORIICC-ASP- 14-20-OR-vol-I-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/78LGSQ6D] (archived Apr. 4, 2016).
40.
Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 38.
41.
See Rome Statute, supra note 37, arts. 12-13 (outlining the circumstances
under which the ICC may exercise jurisdiction).
42.

Propio Motu, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).

43.

Rome Statute, supra note 37, arts. 13, 15.

44.

Id. art. 12,

3.

45.

Id. art. 12,

2.
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C. Article 53. Initiation of an Investigation
An exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 12 and 13 is dependent
upon a preliminary examination into the situation revealing that
there is a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed. 46 This
preliminary examination may be based upon information submitted
to the OTP by individuals, groups, states, or organizations; on
referral by a State Party or the Security Council; or on a non-State
47
Party's declaration that it accepts the jurisdiction of the Court.
In the event that the Prosecutor determines that there is a
reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court has been or is being committed, Article 53 provides that the
Prosecutor "shall" initiate an investigation. 48 This phrasing is
slightly confusing, as it implies that the Office of the Prosecutor,
NGOs, states, or Security Council referrers have not already been
"investigating." However, the investigation by these entities prior to
an Article 53 initiation may more clearly be thought of as preinvestigation, or as the Office of the Prosecutor deems it, a
preliminary examination. 49 Preliminary examination is the
determination of whether there is in fact a crime to be investigated.
The corollary in the U.S. system, for example, is the period of
investigation prior to an arrest; investigators must complete
preliminary investigations before they can demonstrate the probable
cause required to arrest a suspect. "[T]he Office conducts a
preliminary examination of all situations that come to its attention
50
based on the statutory criteria and information available."
The Prosecutor's initiation of an official investigation into a
situation is further subject to the jurisdictional criteria of Articles 11
and 12, which respectively impose temporal and subject matter
restrictions on the Court's jurisdiction. 5 1 Initiation of an investigation

46.

See id. art. 53,

1.

INT'L CRIMINAL COURT [ICC] OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, REPORT ON
47.
2 (Nov. 12, 2015) [hereinafter
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES (2015) 2,

PreliminaryExamination Report], https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PE-rep-2015Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MWX-7F7S] (archived Apr. 4, 2016).
1.
48.
Rome Statute, supra note 37, art. 53,
See generally PreliminaryExamination Report, supra note 47.
49.
50.
Id. at 2, 1.
51.
See Rome Statute, supra note 37, arts. 11-12 (establishing the Court's
jurisdictional limitations, "[jlurisdiction ratione temporis" and "[p]reconditions to the
exercise of jurisdiction"].
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is also subject to the admissibility requirements of Article 1752 and
53
"the interests of justice."
D. Article 54: Duties and Powers of the Prosecutorwith Respect to
Investigations
Article 54 applies once an official investigation has been initiated
by the Prosecutor and describes the Prosecutor's investigative duties
and powers. 54 Article 54 imposes three responsibilities upon the
Prosecutor. 55 First, she must "extend the investigation to cover all
facts and evidence relevant . . . and, in doing so, investigate
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally[.]" 56 Second,
she must "[take appropriate measures to ensure the effective
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court, and . . . respect the interests and personal circumstances of
victims and witnesses ... [.]"57 Finally, she must "[f]ully respect the

58
rights of persons arising under this Statute."
In addition, paragraph three of Article 54 articulates six
investigative powers of the Prosecutor. 59 These include the power to
(1) collect and examine evidence; (2) question victims, suspects, and
witnesses; (3) seek the cooperation of a state or organization in an
investigation; (4) make arrangements or agreements necessary to
facilitate the cooperation of such state or organization; (5) execute
confidentiality agreements regarding documents or information
obtained, "solely for the purpose of generating new evidence"; and (6)
take steps to ensure confidentiality of information, protection of
60
individuals, and/or preservation of evidence.

52.
See id. art. 17 (setting forth several factors to be evaluated in the Court's
determination of whether to admit a case into ICC jurisdiction, including whether a
case is being prosecuted by a state with jurisdiction over it, and whether it is of
"sufficient gravity" to justify action by the Court).
53.
Id. art. 53,
1 (noting that, in evaluating the interests of justice, the
Prosecutor should consider "the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims"); see
also PreliminaryExamination Report, supra note 47, at 2, 3 (describing the Article 53
legal requirements for initiation of an investigation and explaining that they are to be
satisfied during a preliminary examination).
54.
See Rome Statute, supra note 37, art. 54 (describing the guidelines under
which the Prosecutor is to carry out an investigation).
55.
Id. art. 54,
1 (articulating three things the Prosecutor "shall" do with
respect to investigations).
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
Id. art. 54, 3.
60.
Id. (emphasis added).
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E. Article 55. Rights of Persons During an Investigation
Article 55(1) spells out the rights not of a defendant, but of any
person involved in an investigation carried out by the ICC
Prosecutor. 61 These rights include (1) the right against selfincrimination; (2) the right to be free from coercion, torture, or
similarly cruel forms of threat or punishment; (3) the right to have an
interpreter and/or translations provided free of cost if one is being
questioned in a language one does not fully understand or speak; and
(4) the right to be free from "arbitrary arrest or detention" and other
62
deprivations of liberty, except as authorized by the Statute.
Article 55(2) more specifically describes the rights of those
persons for whom there are grounds to believe that he or she
committed a crime under the Statute, as they apply to questioning
during investigation. 63 Strikingly, these rights apply whether the
Prosecutor or "nationalauthorities pursuant to a request made under
Part 9" of the Statute is conducting the questioning. 64 The person
being questioned must be informed of his or her rights before being
questioned 6 5 (just as, in the United States, an individual must be
given his Miranda warning prior to interrogation). These rights are:
(1) to be informed that there are grounds to believe that the person
committed a crime under the Statute; (2) to remain silent and not
have silence construed as determinative of guilt or innocence; (3) to
have legal assistance "where the interests of justice so require" and
free of charge if necessary; and (4) to have counsel present during
66
questioning, absent a voluntary waiver of that right.
F. Articles 56, 61, and 64-67: The Rights of the Accused
Numerous other articles in the Statute make provisions for "the
rights of the defence." 67 Article 56 permits the Pre-Trial Chamber to
take measures to ensure the integrity of certain kinds of investigative
proceedings (namely those for which the opportunity to conduct them
may only arise once), with examples of such measures being the
68
appointment of counsel and the requirement that a record be made.
Article 61, providing for pre-trial confirmation of charges hearings,
raises the evidentiary standard by which the prosecution is bound,

1 (articulating the rights of a person "[i]n respect of an
See id. art. 55,
61.
investigation under this Statute").
Id.
62.
See id. art. 55, 2.
63.
Id. (emphasis added) (stating when Article 55 protections apply to a
64.
suspect).
Id.
65.
66.
Id.
Id. art. 56, 1.
67.
68.
Id. art. 56.
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from "reasonable grounds" to "substantial grounds" to believe that the
accused committed a crime under the Statute. 69 Article 64 requires
that the Trial Chamber "shall ensure that a trial is fair and
expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the
70
accused."
Articles 65 through 67 are the primary statutory safeguards of
ICC defendants' rights. Article 65 requires that the Trial Chamber
determine that an accused's admission of guilt meets several
requirements. 7 1 An admission of guilt must be given voluntarily by
an accused who understands the "nature and consequences" of his
admission and has had a sufficient opportunity to consult with
counsel. 72 The admission must be supported by facts that are
accepted by the accused and contained in the Prosecutor's charges,
supplemental materials submitted by the Prosecutor, and any other
evidence, like witness testimony, presented by either party. 73 Article
65 further gives the Trial Chamber discretion to accept or deny an
admission of guilt based on the facts presented and to either order
that trial proceedings continue or require the prosecution to present
74
further evidence before the defendant is convicted.
Article 66 provides that a defendant is innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 75 Article 67 is lengthy, requiring
that the accused be given a fair, impartial, public hearing, subject to
several "minimum guarantees." 76 Relevant for the purposes of this
Note, the accused has the right to examine the witnesses against him
and present witnesses on his behalf, and to present defenses and
evidence in his defense. 77 Additionally, the accused must remain free
78
from the burden of proof or rebuttal.
Most important to a discussion of evidentiary considerations is
paragraph two of Article 67, which guarantees an independent right
of the accused, not exclusive to trial proceedings: "[T]he Prosecutor
shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the
Prosecutor's possession or control which he or she believes shows or
tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of

69.
See id. art. 61,
7 ("At the hearing, the Prosecutor shall support each
charge with sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the
person committed the crime charged.").
70.
Id. art. 64, 2.
71.
See id. art. 65, 1 (providing for what the Trial Chamber "shall determine"
when an accused makes an admission of guilt).
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Id. art. 65,
2-4.
75.
Id. art. 66.
76.
See id. art. 67 (detailing the extensive "[r]ights of the accused").
77.
Id.
78.
Id.

20161

EVIDENCE FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

831

the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution
79
evidence."
G. Articles 69 and 73: Evidence
Article 69 sets forth several provisions regarding the
presentation of evidence.8 0 For example, witnesses must give an oath
attesting to the truthfulness of their testimony.8 1 Testimony must be
given in person, subject to narrow exceptions for audio, video, or
written testimony, but "[t]hese measures shall not be prejudicial to or
inconsistent with the rights of the accused. '8 2 The Court ultimately
determines the relevance and admissibility of each piece of evidence,
and in doing so must consider the probative and prejudicial value of
each piece of evidence. 8 3 The Court must defer to confidentiality
privileges as laid out in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 8 4 There
is also an exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence, although
85
the rule is subject to considerations of fairness and reliability.
Article 73 specifically addresses "[t]hird-party information or
documents."8 6 In full, it provides:
If a State Party is requested by the Court to provide a document or information
in its custody, possession or control, which was disclosed to it in confidence by a
State, intergovernmental organization or international organization, it shall
seek the consent of the originator to disclose that document or information. If
the originator is a State Party, it shall either consent to disclosure of the
information or document or undertake to resolve the issue of disclosure with
the Court, subject to the provisions of article 72. If the originator is not a
State Party and refuses to consent to disclosure, the requested State
shall inform the Court that it is unable to provide the document or
information because of a pre-existing obligation of confidentiality to
87

the originator.

III.

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES IN ICC INVESTIGATIONS

This Part will evaluate the flaws in OTP investigations in two
instances: the Lubanga case and the Kenya situation. Though
Lubanga has been analyzed elsewhere in the literature, an overview
of the fundamental (to ICC jurisprudence) evidentiary considerations

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. art. 67, 2.
See id. art. 69.
Id. art. 69, 1.
Id. art. 69, 2.
Id. art. 69, 4.
Id. art. 69, 5.
Id. art. 69, 7.
Id. art. 73.
Id. (emphasis added).

832

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 49:819

in that case is necessary for any discussion of ICC investigations. The
Kenya prosecutions are still ongoing; thus, the investigations of that
situation may serve as an ideal catalyst for considerations of
investigative reform. Part III will then conclude with a holistic

evaluation of OTP investigative practices, especially in relation to the
previously discussed provisions of the Rome Statute.
A. The Lubanga Case
The first case tried in the ICC was The Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo.

fourteen

years'

88

Thomas Lubanga was convicted and sentenced to

imprisonment 89 after proceedings

fraught with

evidentiary concerns. 90 Partly because Lubanga is one of only two
defendants to have come all the way through the trial process to

conviction, 91 the evidentiary issues confronted throughout his case
are well documented. 9 2 Thus, his case is an optimal vehicle by which
to examine the investigative practices employed by the Office of the
Prosecutor.

Ongoing violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
from which the Lubanga case originated, impeded evidentiary factfinding from the beginning of ICC investigators' efforts there. 93 The
unstable environment meant that the Prosecutor's investigators were
unable to establish a base in the country for two years and even then

88.
Caroline Buisman, Delegating Investigations: Lessons to Be Learned from
the Lubanga Judgment, 11 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 30,
1 (2013); see ICC-01/0401/06: The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT [ICC]
[hereinafter Lubanga Summary], http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/icc/situations%
20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20casesicc%200104%2001
06/Pages/democratic%20republico20ofo2Othe%20congo.aspx
[https://perma.cc/D5KSXZSW] (archived Mar. 3, 2016).
89.
Lubanga Summary, supra note 88.
90.
See, e.g., Buisman, supra note 88 (analyzing the evidentiary problems in
the Lubanga proceedings presented by the use of third-party evidence, intermediaries,
and other OTP investigative techniques).
91.
See Situations and Cases, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT [ICC] [hereinafter ICC
Situations and Cases], http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/
Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx [https://perma.cc/D7FA-ANNK] (archived Mar.
3, 2016) (reviewing status of proceedings in the nine situations investigated by the
ICC, and noting only two convictions).
92.
See, e.g., Kai Ambos, Confidential Investigations (Article 54(3)(E) ICC
Statute) vs. Disclosure Obligations: The Lubanga Case and National Law, 12 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 543 (2009) (evaluating the confidentiality and disclosure issues presented
by, and decided by, the Lubanga case); Elena Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, 14
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 121 (2009) (reviewing the OTP's use of third-party
evidence through an analysis of the Lubanga case); Buisman, supra note 88;
Christodoulos Kaoutzanis, A Turbulent Adolescence Ahead: The ICC's Insistence on
Disclosurein the Lubanga Trial, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 263 (2013) (closely
analyzing the legal decisions made in Lubanga regarding evidence admission).
93.
See Buisman, supra note 88,
9-12 (describing the safety and security
concerns that prevented investigators from carrying out their mandate).
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were unable to travel or interview witnesses freely. 94 This latter
problem was due also in part to the risk to witnesses posed by
association with the Court. 95 Subsequently, the Prosecutor chose to
rely heavily on intermediaries, individuals with ties to the local
communities who have the ability to contact and facilitate interviews
with witnesses without suspicion and transmit information to the
ICC investigators. 96 In addition, the Office of the Prosecutor gleaned
information from the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC), 9 7 the UN human rights mission in
98
the DRC, as well as other NGO and third-party investigations.
Much of this information was provided to the OTP on condition of
99
confidentiality, pursuant to Article 54 of the Rome Statute.
But rather than relying on these sources as 'lead evidence," as
contemplated by Article 54, and following their trail to primary
sources of evidence, the Prosecutor instead "[took] that information
into court as evidence, at what appears to be an unprecedented
level."'100 Indeed, evidence from third parties comprised 55 percent of
10 1
pre-trial evidence submissions in the Lubanga case.
Though the Pre-Trial Chamber admitted these pieces of thirdparty evidence despite "defense objections that they were anonymous
hearsay the reliability of which could not be confirmed," 10 2 conflicts
arose at trial when the prosecution refused to disclose admittedly
exculpatory evidence to the defense as well as to the judges because of
the confidentiality agreements. 10 3 Indeed, "[w]ith the exception of the
U.N., whose presence had been revealed by the OTP, [the defense and
the Trial Chamber] did not even know who the information providers
were." 10 4 Ultimately, after a stay in the proceedings and during
review by the Appellate Chamber, the third-party investigators
conceded that the exculpatory information they had supplied could be

94.
See id.
95.
See id.
12 ("Mhe investigators feared that informants would be
subjected to threats or abduction from their own communities if it became known that
they had given incriminating information against some of the still-popular militia
leaders.")
15-16.
96.
Id.

As of July 1, 2010, this organization was renamed the United Nations
97.
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUSCO). MONUC: UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO [hereinafter MONUCI, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
missions/past/monuc/ [https://perma.cc/H6Y8-8FFP] (archived Mar. 2, 2016).
98.
Buisman, supra note 88, 7 15. See generally MONUC, supra note 97.

99.
Kaoutzanis, supra note 92, at 277.
100.
Baylis, supra note 92, at 130 (arguing that Lubanga revealed for the first
time the extent to which the OTP relies on third-party evidence).
Id.
101.
102.
Id.
103.
Buisman, supra note 88, 18.
104.
Kaoutzanis, supra note 92, at 278.

834

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 49:819

provided to the judges of both the Trial and Appellate Chambers for a
determination of which documents would be disclosed to the
defense. 105 The prosecution directly disclosed some documents,
without redaction, to the defense. 106 The Trial Chamber then
determined what of the remaining confidential information required
disclosure to the defense, making accommodations (such as providing
"the disclosure of alternative evidence or summaries") when
disclosure risked endangering a victim, witness, named individual, or
10 7
their families.
Moreover, beginning on day one of trial, several witnesses
recanted, alleging that intermediaries had coerced them into lying or
fed them stories. 10 8 Since the prosecution had not corroborated these
witnesses' testimony with independent evidence, the Chamber, in
coming to a decision, expended significant time and resources
evaluating the credibility of these witnesses and the methods
employed by the intermediaries. 10 9 The prosecution also refused to
disclose the identities of most of the intermediaries; the result was
another stay in the proceedings, and even the release of the
defendant, while the prosecution refused to heed numerous orders
from the Trial and Appellate Chambers to identify the
intermediaries. 110 Ultimately, the prosecution did disclose the
identities of or call to the stand the intermediaries, and the Trial
Chamber determined that three had improperly influenced the
11 1
investigative process.
Despite the condemnation of the prosecution's use of
intermediaries in the Lubanga judgment, the OTP continued to
employ the very same individuals who were deemed to have acted
improperly by the Trial Chamber. 112 One intermediary who
continued to perform investigatory work for the Office of the
Prosecutor was later revealed to have concocted threats against
himself, his assistant, and his assistant's family and was almost
certainly known, even as he completed assignments for the Lubanga
investigation, to also be working as a government intelligence agent
for the DRC. 113 Two other intermediaries were determined to have
likely encouraged witnesses to provide false evidence. 1 14 As a result,
all totaled, nine of the child soldier witnesses in the Lubanga trial

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 278-82.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 281-82 (quoting opinion).
Buisman, supranote 88, 7 21-22.
Id. $T 25-26.
Kaoutzanis, supra note 92, at 290-94.
Id. at 294-95.
Buisman, supranote 88,
28-31.
Id.
27-29.
Id. 26.
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were deemed not credible by the Trial Chamber. 115 As Dr. Caroline
Buisman, the author of Delegating Investigations: Lessons to Be
Learned from the Lubanga Judgment, contends, "Lubanga was
convicted, but not on the evidence of those who were alleged to be the
116
victims of the crimes he had committed."
B. The Kenya Investigations
Of the nine situations into which the Office of the Prosecutor has
initiated an investigation, only two have been the result of a proprio
motu investigation, 117 which may indicate the reluctance of the
Prosecutor to essentially override a state's sovereignty by declaring
jurisdiction over a situation. The first proprio motu investigation was
authorized in 2010;118 the subject of the investigation was the post2007 election conflict in Kenya. 119 Although the charges against
Kenyan defendant Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta were withdrawn in
December 2015,120 prosecutions

of other cases arising out of the

12 1
The records of the investigations
situation in Kenya are ongoing.
in Kenya reveal not the reliance on intermediaries condemned in the

Lubanga decision, but the problems inherent in the OTP's depending
on third-party investigators and information providers
evidence used to directly prove the guilt of an accused.

for

the

Much like the Lubanga proceedings, the situation in Kenya and
the cases it has produced have been defined, from the beginning, by
issues concerning the prosecution's evidence. For example, during his
opening statement in the joint trial of William Ruto and Joshua Sang,
condemned the
defense
attorney Karim Khan unequivocally
investigative practices of the Office of the Prosecutor:
Because, your Honour, what the Prosecutor did, what Mr Ocampo did, is latch
on to an infected information stream. It was convenient, it was easy - it may

115.
Id. 3.
116.
Id. 4.
117.
ICC Situations and Cases, supra note 91.
118.
Id.
119.
See ICC Situations and Cases, supra note 91 ("On 31 March 2010, Preto open an
Trial
Chamber II granted the Prosecution authorisation
investigation proprio motu in the situation of Kenya."). See generally Situation in the
Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome
Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of
Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter Kenya Investigation Authorization], http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/docldoc854562.pdf [https:/Hperma.cc/SJ9A-WRDBI (archived Mar. 3,
2016).
120.
Notice of Withdrawal, supra note 1.
121.
See Kenya ICC-01/09: Situation in the Republic of Kenya, INT'L CRIMINAL
COURT [ICC], http:/lwww.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/icc/situations /%20and%20cases/situat
[https://perma.cc/X59Yionslsituation%20icc%200109[Pages/situation%20index.aspx
26SD] (archived Mar. 3, 2016) (summarizing the status of the cases against William
Samoei Ruto, Joshua Arap Sang, and Walter Osapiri Barasa); see also supra Part I.
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even be described as lazy prosecution, lazy investigations - but he didn't have
regard to the source of the information. He didn't have regard to the various
undercurrents that exist in any sophisticated democracy or in Kenya, and
because of that, the Prosecution were swept along to drawn in an ocean of their
own making of errors, relying upon a drip, drip of evidence that selectively they
have sought to put out, without any regard for the fact that the source of those
1 22
drops is from a very polluted spring. They've been fed a lie.

The "polluted spring" to which Mr. Khan refers is the documents
from the Waki Commission, so termed after its chairman, Kenya
Court of Appeal Judge Philip Waki. 123 The Waki Commission was
established in 2008 by an agreement between the warring parties,
brokered by Kofi Annan and the Panel of Eminent African
Personalities, 1 2 4 and received funding from a UN-backed fund and

the Kenyan government. 125 The Waki Commission's mandate was to
investigate the violence

that unfolded

in

the wake

of the

2007

presidential election and make recommendations for legal, political,
and/or administrative remedies.

12 6

Unlike ICC investigators in the DRC, the Commission was able
to safely operate in Kenya, 1 2 7 likely because it was a government-

sanctioned organization that included several Kenyan nationals and
enjoyed the support of local authorities. 128 In the course of its
investigations, which took place over the course of just a few
months, 129 the Commission conducted public hearings at seven
different locations in
violence.

1 30

Kenya, visiting several sites affected by the

Commission members met with officials from different

government agencies as well as political leaders, including the
Commissioner of Police, the Attorney General, and the Prime
Minister.

13 1

The Commission interviewed or took statements from

122.
Trial Transcript, Prosecutor v. Ruto, supra note 31, at 51.
123.
INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE KENYAN COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY INTO POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE (Jan. 1, 2008) [hereinafter ICTJ Report],
https:H//ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Kenya-Dialog-ue-Inquiry-2008-English.pdf
[https://perma.ccJHC2T-R2UJ] (archived Mar. 2, 2016).
124.
Id.
125.
COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE, REPORT 1 (Oct. 15,
2008) [hereinafter Waki Commission Report], http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/
Reports/Commission-of Inquiry-intoPostElectionViolence.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6
A4-T6N3] (archived Mar. 2, 2016).
126.
ICTJ Report, supra note 123.
127.
See Waki Commission Report, supra note 125, passim (describing the
operations of the Commission on the ground in Kenya).
128.
See id. at 1 (describing the establishment of the Commission).
129.
See id. at 1, 3 (noting that the Commission was established in May of 2007
[sic] [actually 2008] and conducted hearings during July-September 2008); see also
ICTJ Report, supra note 123 (stating Commission Report publication date of October
15, 2008).
130.
Waki Commission Report, supra note 125, at 3.
131.
Id. at 4-5.
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dozens of witnesses, some privately and others publicly, including
13 2
both victims and public officials.
The Report is candid about the Commission's investigative
methodology. It notes that the Commission relied on "background
material and reports from government, nongovernmental, and
community based organizations (NGOs and CBOs) and individuals;
recorded statements of victims taken by our investigators and the
sworn testimony, statements and exhibits of witnesses who came
before [the Commission]" for its findings. 133 The Commission
especially relied on the work of Kenyan civil society organizations,
such as Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice, the Kenya Human
Rights Commission, and several faith-based groups. 13 4 Such entities
contributed to the work of the Commission in a number of ways: they
(1) supplied the Commission with their own background reports on
the history of human rights violations in Kenya; (2) gave the
Commission access to witness statements and other records, such as
mappings of sites important to the Commission's investigations; (3)
put Commission members in contact with local leaders, victims, and
other contacts in communities "where they had established trust and
credibility"; and (4) provided emotional and other support to
victims. 135 Additionally,
the
Commission permitted
such
organizations and other citizens' advocacy groups to participate in its
investigations by granting them legal standing; their lawyers thus
supplied witnesses who provided testimony to the Commission. 136
The Commission Report declares that it "treated this [thirdparty] information as it did any other: testing and evaluating it
independently to complement its own findings." 13 7 Yet it is unclear to
what extent this statement is true. The report does not reveal the
methodology or framework by which third-party evidence was
corroborated. And the report is honest in its assessments of
thoroughness. By way of example, in noting that the information
gleaned from Commission work in a particular region appears not to
reflect the full story available from that area, the Report explains
that "the Commission received little or no assistance in the
mobilisation of witnesses and individuals who could testify from
organized groups within the region," with the result that the only

132.
Id. at 8-15 (detailing the methodological practices of the Commission in
gathering evidence).
133.
Id. at 10.
134.
Id. at 5-6 (stating that "[tihe Commission deliberately decided to work
closely with Kenyan civil society organizations and seek their assistance with
information, contacts, and expertise in areas related to post-election violence," and
listing these organizations).
135.
Id. at 6.
136.
Id. at 6-7.
137.
Id. at 8.
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available witnesses were public officials. 138 This, of course,
represents a substantial bias problem in an investigation of election
violence. Further, such a statement reflects the extent to which the
Commission's investigators were dependent on the work of
organizations already embedded in the culture of a particular region
in the country. As the report notes, even when the Commission itself
took the testimony of witnesses, those witnesses were often supplied
by NGOs or other civil society organizations. 13 9 There is no evidence
to suggest that the Commission independently verified the identities
or motivations of such witnesses.
In the same vein, the Commission Report readily admits that
many aspects of the investigation were cut short or omitted in the
interests of time. 140 Similarly, time and resource constraints
frequently required that the Commission rely heavily on reports by
government officials (presenting a significant bias problem) and/or
situation reports by civil society organizations to construct the picture
of violence in a particular area. 141 That is not to say that realistically,
the Commission could have taken the testimony of every single victim
of the post-election conflict, or that resource considerations are not
significant. Every criminal investigation must be governed by a
realistic and ongoing weighing of the costs and benefits of taking a
particular witness's testimony, visiting a given site, or pursuing a
newly discovered evidence trail. Moreover, it is a given that the
Commission's task was to conduct a broad overview of the conflict in a
very short amount of time. Nevertheless, the Commission's
methodology and its potential weaknesses are important given the
extent to which the ICC Prosecutor would come to rely on the
Commission's findings.
Rather than encourage Kenya to domestically handle the
prosecutions of those responsible for the post-election violence, the
Commission effectively handed the Kenya situation directly to the
OTP. The 518-page Commission Report concluded by recommending
that a special tribunal be set up in Kenya to try those responsible for
the post-election violence. 142 If such a tribunal was not established
within sixty days of the Commission Report presentation (and an
authorizing statute enacted within forty-five days of establishment),

Id. at 12-13 (describing the lack of hearings in Western Province).
138.
139.
Id. at 7-8 (discussing the diversity of witness perspectives brought before
the Commission by the civil society groups granted legal standing).
140.
E.g., id. at 11 ("Owing to constraints of time, the Commission did not hold
formal sittings in Central Rift."); id. at 12 ("The Commission did not conduct any
hearings in Western Province due to time constraints.").
141.
See, e.g., id. at 14 ("Taking into account this paucity of information, the
Commission relied heavily on NSIS [National Security Intelligence Service]
Intelligence and situation reports, the KNCHR [Kenya National Commission on
Human Rights] report and reports by various civil society organizations.").
142.
Id. at 472.
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the relevant information regarding the alleged perpetrators of the
violence would be forwarded to the ICC Prosecutor. 143 This, of course,
is exactly what happened. 144 Somewhat curiously, a sealed envelope
containing the names of those the Commission believed to be most
responsible for the violence was first given to Kofi Annan, the former
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who then passed it along to
the ICC Prosecutor. 145 Though the contents of the envelope have not
been disclosed, the list appears to have been the starting point for the
Prosecutor's investigation into the situation. 146 Along with the
14 7
envelope were transmitted six boxes of Commission documents.
One need only glance at the citations in the Pre-Trial Chamber's
decision authorizing the Prosecutor's investigation in Kenya to
discover how reliant the Prosecutor's preliminary examination of the
situation-and the Chamber's subsequent authorization of an official
investigation-was on third-party reports. 148 The decision makes
numerous references to the CIPEV [Waki Commission] Report, the
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights report, the Human
Rights Watch report, and others in "examining the available
information." 149 These reports, cited in the footnotes of and submitted
by the Prosecutor as annexes to her request for authorization,
150
comprise nearly the entirety of the factual basis for her request.

143.
Id. at 473.
Xan Rice, Annan Hands ICC List of Perpetratorsof Post-Election Violence
144.
in Kenya, GUARDIAN (July 9, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/09/
international-criminal-court-kofi-annan [https://perma.cc/GW88-L9ZV] (archived Feb.
19, 2016).
145.
See id. (describing the background and transmission of the envelope).
146.
See Geoffrey Nyamboga, Kenyan Cooperation Crucial to ICC Probe, GLOB.
POL'Y F. (Apr. 23, 2010), https://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/theinternational-criminal-courtlicc-investigationskenya/49057.html?Itemid- 1437 [https:/!
perma.ccI2EYV-S6WY] (archived Feb. 19, 2016) ('Moreno-Ocampo has been working
from a list produced by Waki of 20 key suspects who were involved in the violence. The
list has not been publicly disclosed and Moreno-Ocampo has not confirmed whether the
individuals he is investigating also appear on the Waki list.").
147.
Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court [ICC], ICC Prosecutor Receives
Materials on Post-Election Violence in Kenya, ICC-OTP-20090716-PR438 (July 16,
2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/icc/situations%/20and%20cases/situations/situa
tion%20icc%200109/press20releasesfPages/pr438.aspx [https:lperma.cc/5Y2A-NE94]
(archived Feb. 19, 2016).
148.
See Kenya Investigation Authorization, supra note 119, at 43-80
(reviewing the information submitted to the Court in support of the Prosecutor's
request for authorization).
149.
See id.
150.
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Request for
Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, passim (Nov. 26, 2009), http:/!
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocsldor/doc785972.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DG2-S7L9] (archived Feb.
19, 2016); Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, INT'L
CRIMINAL COURT RCCI (Nov. 26, 2009), http:l/www.icc-cpi.int/enmenuslicc/situations
%20and%20cases/situations/situatin%2icc%200109/court%2recrds/filing%20of%/o20t
he%20participantsoffice%20of%2Othe%20prosecutor/Pages/3.aspx [https:/lperma.cc/55
CP-3F32] (archived Feb. 19, 2016) (providing links to the annexed documents).
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Given the lower standard of proof at the point of investigation
initiation, such reliance might not have been misplaced; a
Prosecutor's request for authorization is essentially a request for
permission to carry out a firsthand investigation. However, this
rationale only extends up until the point that the Pre-Trial Chamber
granted the official investigation request.
As described in the Introduction to this Note, the Prosecutor's
investigation in Kenya, once authorized, was plagued by the Kenyan
government's refusal to cooperate with the investigation. 151 Despite
initial agreement to refer the situation to the ICC if domestic
prosecution proved unworkable, 15 2 the government hotly resisted the
investigation, with Parliament even voting to withdraw from the
ICC. 153 During its investigation, the Office of the Prosecutor
submitted numerous requests to the government for financial and
other records of accused Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta. 154 In November
2013, the prosecution filed an application asking the Trial Chamber
to find the government of Kenya (a party to the Rome Statute) 15 5 in
noncompliance pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Statute, 15 6 which
permits the Court to refer a non-cooperative State Party to the
Assembly of States Parties 157 (the representative body charged with
administration of the ICC). 158 The application alleged that during a
year and a half of communications, the government had delayed
handing over the records and made vague assertions that the request
had been passed on to the proper government agencies. 159 The Trial

151.
See supra Part I (describing the legal back-and-forth between the OTP and
the Government of Kenya).
152.
Nyamboga, supra note 146.
153.
See Kenya MPs Vote to Leave ICC over Poll Violence Claims, BBC (Dec. 23,
2010),
https://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/the-international-criminalcourt/icc-investigations/kenya/49645.html?Itemld=49645
[https://perma.cc/2QXY-JH8
5] (archived Mar. 2, 2016) (describing how "Kenyan MPs ... voted overwhelmingly for
the country to pull out of the treaty which created the International Criminal Court"
after the Prosecutor named six high-level political figures as suspects in the postelection violence); see also supra Part I (discussing the Kenyan government's resistance
to the OTP investigation).
154.
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecution
Application for a Finding of Non-Compliance Pursuant to Article 87(7) Against the
Government of Kenya,
1-2 (Nov. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Prosecution Application],
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doddocl692667.pdf [http://perma.cc/83E7-RPA6] (archived Feb. 19, 2016).
155.
Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court Assembly of States Parties, Kenya
Ratifies Rome Statute, ICC-CPI-20050316-93 (Mar. 16, 2005), http://www.icc-cpi.
int/en-menus/asp/press%20releases/press%20reeases%202005/Pages/kenya%20ratifies
%20rome%20statute.aspx [https://perma.ccWTA7-GEK9] (archived Feb. 19, 2016).
156.
Prosecution Application, supra note 154.
157.
Rome Statute, supra note 37, art. 87, 7.
158.
Id. art. 112 (defining the Assembly of States Parties and its role).
159.
See Prosecution Application, supra note 154,
6-21 (providing a timeline
of the OTP's requests for information and the Kenyan government's responses).
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Chamber's March 2014 decision on this application held that the
Kenyan government was indeed noncompliant with the prosecution's
request but that it would grant an adjournment of trial proceedings
rather than refer Kenya to the Assembly. 160 Records were not
forthcoming, and in December 2014, as noted, the OTP withdrew the
16 1
charges against Mr. Kenyatta.
The Prosecutor's decision to withdraw the charges against Mr.
Kenyatta very publicly demonstrated the extent to which reliance on
third-party information providers hinders the OTP's mission. Rather
than conducting independent investigations to discover Mr.
Kenyatta's records from another source, or to find corroborative
evidence that would enable the OTP to proceed without cooperation
from the Kenyan government, the prosecution single-mindedly
continued to demand cooperation with its records requests. The result
was that the victims of Mr. Kenyatta's actions will likely never see
justice. To a rational (or perhaps cynical) observer, it was clear that
the government was not going to cooperate with the OTP's demands,
Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute notwithstanding. Yet the Prosecutor
persisted in misplaced reliance on the letter of international law
rather than realistic attention to the demands of prosecuting
international criminals. The ICC, after all, only gains jurisdiction
over a case when domestic prosecutions have failed; 16 2 it follows that
such domestic systems will likely not be cooperative assistants to
international prosecution.
Additionally, in the ongoing joint trial of Kenyan defendants
William Ruto and Joseph Sang, the defense has pursued a strategy of
challenging the validity and legality of the prosecution's evidence. For
example, the defense contended that eight of the prosecution's
witnesses had collaborated, in tandem with national and
international organizations, to fabricate their testimony against Mr.
Ruto. 16 3 The defense also opposed the witness preparation procedures
proposed by the prosecution, relying heavily on the Lubanga
decisions to argue that the prosecution was attempting to improperly

160.
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on
Prosecution's Applications for a Finding of Non-Compliance Pursuant to Article 87(7)
46-52 (Mar. 31, 2014), http:I/
and for an Adjournment of the Provisional Trial Date,
(archived
[https:/perma.ccY8X5-GFC3]
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1755190.pdf
Feb. 19, 2016).
161.

Statement of the Prosecutor, supra note 14.

See Rome Statute, supra note 37, art. 17 (stating that "a case is
162.
inadmissible where [t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution.").
163.
Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-0109-01/11, Defence Request Regarding
9 (July 19, 2013), http:II
the First Eight Witnesses to be Called by the Prosecution,
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocsldoc/docl621887.pdf [https://perma.ccI2HWA-EGHE] (archived
Feb. 19, 2016).
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influence witnesses' testimony. 164 In another motion, the defense
opposed the redaction of the prosecution's screening notes, which it
described as "contain[ing] the initial account of a witness of events
that will later form the significant part of his evidence." 165 The
defense went on to argue that the screening notes contained
identifying information that could only be verified if the full record, in
addition to other notations that could bear on the issue of witness
credibility, was provided. 16 6 These concerns, of course, echo those
that plagued the Lubanga trial, although the defense was careful to
note that the disputed screening notes in that case were taken in
regard to intermediaries, not witnesses.167
Nonetheless, the defense strategy in the Ruto-Sang proceedings
reveals the problems posed by the OTP's reliance on evidence it does
not disclose to the defense because of confidentiality considerations.
Without being able to verify a witness's identity and fact-check his or
her claims, the defense cannot point out weaknesses in the witness's
story or make arguments as to questionable motivations. This
practice by the OTP is akin to making prosecution evidence
unassailable, even when it may not factually be so, with no reciprocal
privilege for the defendant.
C. Evaluating Reliance on Third-PartyEvidence
The use of third-party evidence, like that seen in the Lubanga
case and the Kenyan election investigations, is an evidentiary
development unlikely to fade away anytime soon. It is necessitated by
the reality of conducting investigations in violent, unstable countries
frequently hostile to outside attempts to impose justice.
It is notable, however, that the development is a fairly recent
one. 168 Agnieszka Jachec Neale observes that the international
criminal tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia distrusted
"the integrity and probative value" of human rights information, even

See Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Joint Defence Response
164.
1-14 (Sept. 4,
to Prosecution Motion Regarding Scope of Witness Preparation,
2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1463053.pdf [https://perma.cc/48XS-JFRP]
(archived Feb. 19, 2016) (arguing that the prosecution's proposed change in witness
preparation protocol "blurs the line between investigation and proofing on the one hand
and a rehearsal of the evidence on the other").
165.
Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-O1/09-01/11, Joint Defence Request to
7, 9 (Apr. 2, 2013), http:/!
Be Provided with Full, Non-Redacted, Screening Notes,
[https://perma.cc/J8Z3-9VAG]
(archived
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1575644.pdf
Feb. 19, 2016).
10.
166.
Id.
167.
See id. 21 (arguing that Lubanga was inapposite).
168.
See Agnieszka Jachec Neale, Human Rights Fact-Finding into Armed
Conflict and Breaches of the Laws of War, 105 AM. SOC'Y INTL L. PROC. 85, 88 (2011)
(chronicling the rise in reliance on human rights investigative bodies by international
criminal tribunals).
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when used as background evidence. 169 Yet, only a decade later, the
ICC Prosecutor utilized information gathered by UN fact-finding
commissions in Sudan "without the necessary first-hand verification
or corroboration of information, without conducting in situ visits, and
without adequately exploring possibilities for cooperation with the
government and two main rebel movements in Darfur."170 This action
was criticized on the basis that the fact-finding process evaluated
evidence under a lower standard of proof than that required by the
17 1
criminal justice process.
This suspicion of third-party reports may be attributable to the
fact that the ad hoc tribunals were established to conduct
prosecutions subject to very narrow temporal, geographic, and subject
matter constraints. The ICC, conversely, is responsible for
prosecuting "the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole." 172 The Office of the Prosecutor simply cannot
maintain sufficient staff and resources to simultaneously investigate
nine, or more, different situations all in different countries. Thus, it
by necessity will need to "contract out" some of its investigations.
Some commentators argue that the Prosecutor's reliance on
NGOs, UN fact-finding missions, and other third-party organizations
is at the least inevitable but perhaps also desirable. 17 3 Elena Baylis,
Professor at University of Pittsburgh School of Law, observes that
because such entities are "long-term players" in a given location, they
frequently have better contacts and deeper knowledge of relevant
events than investigators who come in after the fact. 1 74 Mariana
Pena, a public international law and international tribunals
consultant, points out that though relying more heavily on national
investigative resources would be theoretically possible, "the court
comes in precisely because the national judicial system lacks
17 5
sufficient will or capacity to investigate itself.
Other commentators disagree. Buisman, for example, argues
that "these organizations have a very different mandate" from the
Office of the Prosecutor, "and do not apply the standard of proof

169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
Rome Statute, supra note 37, Preamble.
172.
173.
See, e.g., Baylis, supra note 92, at 144, 146 (concluding "that the ICC
cannot afford to entirely exclude information garnered from third parties," but arguing
that this may be advantageous, since it enables the OTP to tap into "a network of third
parties [that] is already immersed in the country and has contextual knowledge and on
the ground capacity that the ICC lacks"); Mariana Pena, Criminal Investigations
Overseas: Legal and Policy Issues for an InternationalProsecutor, 28 CRIM.JUST. 22, 25
(2013) (explaining the investigative difficulties that have required the ICC to rely on
secondary evidence).
174.
Baylis, supra note 92, at 125.
Pena, supra note 173, at 25 (articulating why reliance on domestic
175.
prosecutions is often not feasible in practice).
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beyond reasonable doubt." 176 She also notes that they do not apply a
uniform methodology, are not subject to judicial oversight, and bften
do not possess a neutral view of the situation they are tasked with
investigating. 177 Human Rights Watch, for instance, does not have
the responsibility of assessing all the evidence it obtains objectively
and coming to a dispassionate conclusion regarding the guilt of the
accused. Rather, its self-described mandate is "to uphold human
dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all." 178 These goals
are hardly served by acquitting defendants, whether or not they are
guilty.
Perhaps most significantly, these organizations and those acting
on their behalf are not required to abide by any of the protections
accorded defendants by the Rome Statute, namely those described in
Part II of this Note. 179 There are abundant examples from the two
investigations described above of the ways in which use of third-party
evidence violates the rights of the defendant.
1. Lubanga and the Rome Statute
The UN fact-finding commission and other organizations that
supplied evidence in the Lubanga case were not, during the course of
their investigations, held to the same standards as the ICC
Prosecutor. They were neither required to "extend the investigation
to cover all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether
there is criminal responsibility under this Statute," nor to
"investigate
incriminating
and
exonerating
circumstances
equally." 180 Indeed, such organizations are usually entirely one-sided
in their investigations, seeking only inculpatory evidence.
Nor were such entities subject to Article 55, requiring that any
person suspected of committing a crime under the Statute be
informed that he or she is a suspect, have access to legal assistance,
be permitted to remain silent, and be questioned only in the presence
of counsel. 18 1 The use of these organizations' collected evidence at
trial without naming sources or witnesses, and the use of evidence
acquired by anonymous intermediaries, also implicated Article 67's
guarantee of the accused's right to confront the witnesses against

176.
Buisman, supra note 88, 77.
177.
Id. 77 78-79.
178.
About, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/about [https://perma.cc/
Y947-VEPD] (archived Feb. 19, 2016).
179.
See generally supra Part II (analyzing relevant articles of the Rome
Statute).
180.
See Rome Statute, supra note 37, art. 54,
1 (setting forth the
responsibilities of the Prosecutor).
181.
See id. art. 55,
2 (providing for the rights of suspects during an
investigation).
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him. 182 As discussed, such evidence is essentially hearsay, which is
inadmissible in many national courts.
2. Kenya and the Rome Statute
With regard to the Kenya investigations, the OTP's use of the
Waki Commission Report and the reports of other human rights
investigations raises similar issues. The format and nature of the
hearings conducted by the Commission are given short shrift in the
Commission Report, but the Commission was not required to "respect
the interests and personal circumstances of victims and witnesses"
during its investigations. 183 There was no legal prohibition against
the Commission members employing coercion, threats, or other
manipulative and cruel means of obtaining information. 184 If an
individual being questioned by the Commission did not speak the
questioner's language well, there was no guarantee of translation,
and thus no guarantee that recorded witness testimony is
accurate. 185
Article 56's consideration of the protections that should govern a
"unique investigative opportunity," a term which could certainly
apply to many of the Commission interviews, also is not binding on
186
This is despite the fact that failing to
third-party investigators.
keep a record or take other steps to preserve evidence during a onetime opportunity to interview a particular witness, and then relying
on the information gained from that interview at trial, presents a

significant violation of a defendant's rights to hear testimony in
person and to confront witnesses against him at trial. 187

More troublingly, though the Commission of course did not
conduct official trials, the sealed envelope containing the list of
primary suspects has likely influenced the Prosecutor's selection of

1 (articulating the right of a defendant to examine
See id. art. 67,
182.
witnesses against him).
183.
See id. art. 54, 1 (setting forth the responsibilities of the Prosecutor with
respect to investigations).
See id. art. 55, 1 (providing that a person being investigated "[s]hall not
184.
be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or threat, to torture or to any other form of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment").
185.
See id. (providing for questioning only in a language the individual fully
speaks and understands, or in the alternative, interpreting or translation at no cost).
See id. art. 56 (applying protections to testimony or evidence "which may
186.
not be available subsequently for the purposes of a trial").
187.
See id. (establishing special provisions to ensure the integrity of
2
investigation during the gathering of unique evidence or testimony); id. art. 67,
(stating that "[tihe testimony of a witness at trial shall be given in person," subject to
1 (providing for the right of an accused to
certain narrow exceptions); id. art. 67,
examine witnesses against him).
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defendants. 18 8 This suggests that the protections contained in Article
67, which apply "[i]n the determination of any charge," should apply
to the Commission's interviews with the accused (if any exist). 189 Yet
of course there is no such requirement that civil society organizations
make an accused aware of the charges against him or not impose
upon him the burden of proof. But that is exactly what the use of
confidential and therefore irrefutable third-party evidence by the ICC
Prosecutor has done: without knowledge of the identities of witnesses
and the sources of evidence used against him, a defendant cannot
mount an adequate defense, attuned to the nature of the facts levied
against him. The prosecution is able to assert a case against a
defendant without having to prove it, meaning the accused has
effectively been assigned the burden of proving his innocence. Finally,
unlike the Prosecutor under Article 66, groups like Human Rights
Watch are not bound to presume that every person they interview is
innocent. 190
Taking a broader view of the Kenya proceedings, there is also the
reality that the Prosecutor's reliance on the findings of the
Commission is the use of not just secondhand, but of third-hand
evidence. Rather than relying directly on third-party investigations,
the Prosecutor, in many cases, is utilizing the Commission's collection
of evidence from NGOs and civil society organizations. The risk of
corruption, unreliability, and violation of the rights of victims,
witnesses, and defendants alike is thus magnified that much more.

IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: ARTICLE 72 BIS

In the wake of the Kenya investigation failures, the OTP is
uniquely positioned to make changes that will prevent future
thwarted prosecutions. This Part will discuss the need for a
structural, procedural solution to the problems presented by ICC
investigations, as opposed to mere changes in policy, as have
previously been suggested.
A few options for remedying the problems presented by the Office
of the Prosecutor's current investigative infrastructure have already
been suggested. Buisman, for example, discusses (1) increasing the
budget of the Investigations Division and implementing a plan for
utilizing funds more efficiently; (2) adopting a new investigative
strategy that focuses on conducting field investigations prior to
deciding which situations necessitate the opening of an official

188.
See Nyamboga, supra note 146 (discussing the ICC Prosecutor's use of the
Commission's "key suspect" list).
189.
See Rome Statute, supra note 37, art. 67 (providing for the rights of the
accused "[i]n the determination of any charge").
190.
See id. art. 66 (providing for a presumption of innocence).
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investigation; (3) establishing a permanent presence in regions where
investigations are ongoing; (4) verifying evidence collected from thirdparty sources; (5) creating guidelines for third-party organizations to
follow when carrying out investigations that may contribute to
criminal prosecutions; and (6) enhancing cooperative measures with
19
states and private institutions and individuals. 1
What is needed, however, to effectuate a practical change in
investigative practice is not more policy recommendations, but a
structural change to the Rome Statute that will balance the need for
efficient and thorough investigations with defendants' rights. The
problem, after all, is not that the Statute does not protect defendants'
rights; it is that the Statute does not apply to third-party
investigations. A new article inserted after Article 72-a 72 bis, as
similarly inserted additions in the Statute have been captioned192
would be the ideal format.
Though this addition could contain any number of provisions, the
most significant would be a requirement for a pre-trial and precharge evidentiary hearing, requiring the Prosecutor to present all
evidence collected on which she might rely in determining charges.
Pursuant to its powers under Article 56, which permits the Court to
appoint counsel "to attend and represent the interests of the defence"
when there has not yet been an arrest, the Court could name an
attorney to represent the defense at this hearing. This evidentiary
hearing would allow both the prosecution and the defense to examine
all the available evidence without charges coloring the way in which
the evidence is viewed. The collectors of third-party evidence to be
examined would be subject to cross-examination, and their testimony
in turn would be preserved on the record without having to jeopardize
the safety of victims and witnesses by exposing their identities.
Further, because Article 54 only permits the Court to respect
confidentiality agreements when they are made with respect to
leading evidence, 193 such a process would ensure that the only
evidence the prosecution would be able to use throughout proceedings
would be evidence collected firsthand or secondary evidence the
credibility and reliability of which may be evaluated.
When practicable, this hearing should be held at the domestic
level, relying on the infrastructure and resources of national court
systems. Of course, as pointed out previously, the Office of the
Prosecutor is often investigating in the first place because national
judicial systems have proven unable to conduct proceedings. But
collaboration with domestic systems to carry out functions of the
Court could be a method of rebuilding broken domestic judicial
structures. The fundamental objective of the Court, after all, is to

191.
192.
193.

170-92.
Buisman, supra note 88,
See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 37, art. 8 bis.
Id. art. 54, 3.
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only prosecute those crimes of concern to the entire international
community, thereby reinforcing states' role as the primary enforcers
of criminal law. The Preamble of the Rome Statute alludes to this
idea several times, as when it "emphasiz[es] that the International
Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions[.]" 194 Building a
new system of justice from the ground up certainly requires guidance
from the more experienced, and such an arrangement would typify
the kind of symbiotic relationship between states and the Court
originally envisioned by the Statute.
Secondly, this article would require the verification and
corroboration of any third-party evidence that the Prosecutor
presents at the evidentiary hearing. Such a requirement ensures that
judges are not the sole gatekeepers determining the credibility of a
given piece of evidence or a particular witness's testimony after the
fact, during the process of writing an opinion. Rather, the
presentation of evidence would speak for itself, and like evidence
presentation in any adversarial system, the prosecution would be
incentivized to pursue and corroborate only the most promising
evidence. This requirement would help to implement the original
intent of Article 54's focus on leading evidence: confidentially
obtained evidence was never meant to be the primary factual basis
for the prosecution's case; it was meant to be evaluated and
independently verified by the Office of the Prosecutor. 195
Thirdly, this article would establish the ability of the Prosecutor
to set up an investigative fact-finding commission, similar to a UN
fact-finding commission, for the sole and specific purpose of carrying
out the Prosecutor's investigations in a given situation. Rather than
relying on the findings of a commission after the fact or eschewing the
valuable expertise of NGOs entirely, this setup allows for an NGO
with ties in a region to deploy its experts under the close oversight of
the Office of the Prosecutor. By way of instructive example, an NGO
fact-finding mission in Kosovo collected nearly 5,000 records from
victims and witnesses in the form of documented answers to a
predetermined set of questions, rather than in the form of
statements. 196 The records were stored in an electronic database and
submitted to the ICTY; the commission also provided the tribunal
with a list of witnesses investigators could choose to interview in
depth. 197

194.
Id. Preamble.
3 (permitting confidentiality agreements to obtain
195.
See id. art. 54,
evidence used "solely for the purpose of generating new evidence").
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE ROLE OF HuMAN RIGHTS NGOs IN RELATION TO
196.
ICC INVESTIGATIONS 7 (Sept. 2004), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/HRF-NGO_
RoleInvestigations_0904.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RKM-J59P] (archived Feb. 19, 2016).
197.
Id.
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One benefit of this addition to the Rome Statute would, of course,
be the bolstered protection of defendants' rights. If the primary
criticism levied at Nuremberg was the cry of "victor's justice," the ICC
Prosecutor has arguably struggled most publicly with failing to
protect the rights of the accused. An evidentiary hearing would fulfill
the Prosecutor's mandate to "investigate incriminating and
exonerating circumstances equally" by enabling the defense and
presiding judges to review the evidence and point out weakness and
evidentiary
Court's
the
with
inconsistencies
potential
requirements. 198 This would also fulfill the statutory requirement
arguably at the core of the evidentiary issues in the Lubanga and
Kenya cases: Article 67's requirement that the Prosecutor disclose
any potentially exculpatory evidence. 199 That mandate, which
provides that "the Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to
the defence" any exculpatory evidence, 20 0 points strongly in favor of
an enforcement mechanism, such as the procedural reforms described
here. Given the current state of OTP investigations, an honor system
is clearly insufficient motivation to ensure that the Prosecutor
discloses all the evidence that might be helpful to the defendant. A
screening hearing and evidence verification requirements would
effectuate Article 67(2)'s purpose.
By excluding from consideration uncorroborated third-party
evidence and requiring the prosecution to disclose any evidence it
intends to use at trial, an Article 72 bis would also expedite
proceedings. Opponents of this procedural addition might claim that
it only adds to the many hurdles the Prosecutor must clear before a
criminal can be brought to justice. However, it would do just the
opposite by eliminating from the criminal process thousands of pages
of inscrutable evidence and hours of unreliable witness testimony.
Currently, cases at the ICC require years to be resolved, which has
cut strongly against the Court's image as the primary enforcer of
international criminal law. Had an Article 72 bis been included in the
Rome Statute when the Kenya investigations began, the Kenyatta
prosecution would never have dragged on for so long or dealt such a
devastating blow to the OTP's reputation.
Exposing more of the Prosecutor's investigative process to the
scrutiny of judges would, further, independently promote better
evidence and thus more accurate outcomes. Evidence not up to
statutory snuff would either fail to be gathered in the first place or

1 (denoting the Prosecutor's
See Rome Statute, supra note 37, art. 54,
198.
responsibilities).
199.
See id. art. 67, 2 ("Mhe Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose
to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or control which he or she
believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of
the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence.").
Id.
200.
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would be thrown out earlier in the proceedings. More rigorously
obtained and vetted evidence helps criminal prosecutions come as
close as they possibly can to ascertaining the truth.
Critics may contend that the pre-trial confirmation of charges
hearing already adequately performs the function that would be
served by a pre-charge evidentiary hearing. As discussed in Part II of
this Note, Article 61 applies a "substantial grounds" standard at the
confirmation of charges hearing. 20 1 The provisions of Article 61 itself
impose few restrictions on the evidence that may be used to show
"substantial grounds." 20 2 In practice, the Pre-Trial Chamber has
passed the buck to the Trial Chamber, treating the confirmation of
charges evaluation much like a ruling on a motion to dismiss in the
American system. 20 3 In other words, all facts alleged are construed in
favor of the Prosecutor, and the Pre-Trial Chamber does not assess
the sufficiency of the evidence used to support the OTP's
allegations. 20 4 There is little in the way of guidance in ICC case law
to direct the Pre-Trial Chamber in confirming or rejecting the
charges, so there is consequently nothing to prevent the confirmation
of charges hearing from remaining toothless.
Likely the most substantial problem posed by this solution is the
question of whether it will be adequately enforced, given that the
OTP has successfully skirted other provisions of the Statute.
Provisions of the Rome Statute are only relevant so long as the
organs of the ICC follow them, and changes in practice at the level of
the Investigations Division will be necessary to implement an Article
72 bis. But this is certainly also true of any other proposed change to
the methodology of ICC investigations. And a permanent and binding
statutory addition possesses more authority than changes that can be
amended or revoked. Moreover, a formal hearing and exclusionary
rule are much more difficult to avoid than are procedural
requirements that lack enforcement mechanisms.
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Id. art. 61, 5; see also supra Part II (analyzing relevant provisions of the
Rome Statute).
202.
See id. ('The Prosecutor may rely on documentary or summary evidence
and need not call the witnesses expected to testify at the trial.").
203.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public
Redacted Version, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a)
and (b) of the Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc1314543.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GSN-5QYY] (archived Apr. 9, 2016) (confirming
all but one of the charges against Kenyatta before they were withdrawn by the
Prosecutor for lack of evidence).
204.
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("To survive a motion
to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." (citing Bell Atlantic
Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570 (2007))).
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Furthermore, this proposal is not mutually exclusive with policy
changes such as those that have been recommended elsewhere. A
structural addition to the Statute does not preclude the Office of the
Prosecutor from making internal procedural changes or from
promulgating guidelines for civil society investigators.

V. CONCLUSION

The ICC Prosecutor holds a'tremendously powerful position,
which entails both great privilege and great responsibility: she has
the ability to prosecute and hold responsible those individuals
responsible for the most heinous crimes committed across the globe.
This authority stands as a lasting testament to the first international
criminal prosecutions at Nuremberg. However, vesting such power in
a single office compels the stringent protections of victims',
witnesses', and defendants' rights as they are set forth in the Rome
Statute. Ensuring that the Prosecutor can effectuate her mandate
while not trampling upon these protections entails a delicate
balancing of interests that is best effectuated by permanent statutory
determination rather than flexible (and thus easily ignored) policies.
Thus, the conflicts with statutory protections that arise from the
OTP's current investigative infrastructure are best addressed by
amending the Statute itself.
Moreover, such an amendment ensures that the Prosecutor is
able to perform her duties to the fullest. When the Prosecutor's
investigators exceed the bounds of their power in the interests of
"doing justice," they, ironically, defeat the aim for which the ICC was
established. As Robert Jackson famously stated in his opening
address at Nuremberg, "That ... great nations, flushed with victory
and stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily
submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the
most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason." 20 5 The
authority of the ICC Prosecutor, then, must similarly be subject to
the limits of the law.
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